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DISCOVERY COST ALLOCATION: COMMENT ON
COOTER AND RUBINFELD
EDWARD H. COOPER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

DISCOVERY practice continues to be the single most troubling element
of contemporary procedure. To be sure, the system seems to work well
in a high proportion of all federal cases. The proportion may seem astonishingly high in relation to the amount of attention devoted to discovery.
The discovery problems that occur in a relatively small proportion of the
federal caseload, however, impose serious burdens on the parties and the
court system. Every proposal that addresses discovery "abuse" deserves
serious attention. These comments focus on the discovery abuse portion
of the paper by Cooter and Rubinfeld. Questions are posed that may have
persuasive answers. Whether or not there are persuasive answers, the
paper is a great success because it forces consideration and reconsideration of the very nature of discovery. Much can be learned by grappling
with this proposal.
The dilemma of discovery reform can be introduced by remembering
Civil Rule 1. The Rules are construed and applied "to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." We want justice. But we know that we must reconcile our desire for justice with the
need to get lawsuits decided, and decided without undue delay or expense. We hope discovery makes results more just. We believe, and have
been given an elegant model to demonstrate, that discovery can promote
settlement. We know it can often increase delay and expense. We cannot
really know whether the present system achieves a better blend of cost
with justice by judgment and settlement than might be achieved by a
* Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Presented at the John
M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Conference on "Economic Analysis of Civil
Procedure" at the University of Virginia School of Law, March 26-27, 1993.
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dramatically different system. A system with no discovery, more trials,
and less settlement might be better. Most reform discussion, however, is
set in the framework of more modest proposals. Proposals to shift the
costs of discovery fit into this mold.
The problem of excessive discovery seems reasonably straightforward.
Discovery rules are designed to enable a party to force others, parties
and nonparties, to disclose information. The inquiring party does not
bear all the costs of the process. The costs of responding, which include
interpreting the demand, gathering the information, and formulating and
delivering a response, are borne by the responding party. In addition,
the opportunity to seek information that need not be disclosed at trial
encourages pursuit of information that would not be sought at trial for
fear of unfavorable surprise. The first question is why the inquiring party
should not have to bear all the costs of responding. What makes it fair
to compel an opposing party, or a nonparty, to bear a cost of providing
information it might choose to produce at trial or not to produce at all?
This question has been answered by evolution of the adversary system,
not articulated principle. If a different answer had been given-if the
inquiring party were required to shoulder all the costs of compliance,
including the time costs-the discovery problem would be much different.
The question of "abuse" arises when part of the cost is borne by the
person responding. In approaching this question, it may help to recognize
that much untoward discovery results from ineptness, not some darker
motive. It seems fair to assert that much discovery is conducted by people who are not trial litigators. They have little sense of the realistic needs
of trial, nor of the manageable possibilities of trial. The discussion may
be helped by distinguishing among "overuse" resulting from the opportunity to ask questions without bearing the cost of response, inept "misuse," and malevolent "abuse." By far the most important question raised
by this exchange is whether the costs of discovery compliance should be
reallocated in order to reduce overuse.
If some reason is found for insisting that a person responding to discovery should bear part of the response cost, the division of costs can be
made only by articulating a theory of allocation. There is a certain abstract charm to the theory that the requesting party should be free to
demand discovery up to the point at which the cost of compliance equals
the expected value to the requesting party. At least if adjustment is made
for the costs of demanding and evaluating the response, a system that
equates the marginal cost of discovery with the marginal benefit seems
sensible enough. But the reason for allocating part of the cost to a party
who benefits and part to another person who gains no benefit, and may
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be harmed, remains to be identified. Shifting from the abstract formula
to implementation, moreover, leads to several obvious problems.
One major part of the problem is the nature of discovery: the demanding party often has no idea what to expect. All that is possible is
comparison across some universe of cases with some degree of abstract
similarity to this case. A question about inspection practices, for example, may have an expected yield of X in all tort cases, 2X in all product
liability cases, and 4X in "foreign-object-in-the-bottle" product liability
cases. The value in a specific case cannot be known until the question is
answered. Setting a value after discovery is almost as difficult. The actual
value of information will depend on many factors, including the relative
astuteness of the person who gains it.
A deeper part of the problem is to find a theory that explains why
the responding person should be expected to invest more in producing
information that is more valuable to its adversary or to one or more
parties in litigation between strangers.
The problems are sufficient that the "abuse" formulation is apparently
abandoned when it comes time to suggest an actual rule for reallocating
discovery costs. Instead, the parties are to share equally the cost of all
reasonable discovery. If compliance costs are $1,000 for plaintiff and
$2,000 for defendant, each bears $1,500. Each also would bear $1,500 if
compliance costs were $2,000 for plaintiff and $1,000 for defendant. The
figure that represents half the total cost of reasonable discovery by both
parties (here $1,500), cL, is designated as the "shifting point." The demanding party pays all compliance costs for additional discovery once
the costs of the responding party reach the shifting point. This result
might be justified in several ways. One would be an abstract assertion
that it is "fair" to allocate evenly the costs of discovery, even if no other
costs are allocated evenly. Another is the justification offered here: even
allocation achieves symmetry of discovery costs, easing the way toward
a settlement that corresponds to the "correct" trial judgment.
Problems remain with this alternative. I have reacted to the cost allocation proposal from a pragmatic perspective, asking whether it should be
incorporated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. My reactions have
been those of an academic lawyer, imagining the difficulties of drafting
and implementing a new rule. It is difficult to array in an entirely coherent
order the welter of difficulties that bubble to the surface. They can be
grouped, however, in three rough categories. First come the practical
difficulties. Second come theoretical doubts about the wisdom of the
allocation, addressed more or less in its own terms. Finally come reflections on the questions the proposal raises as to the nature and purpose
of discovery in an adversary trial system. These categories cannot be
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separated neatly. The discussion of each will overlap and anticipate or
reflect the discussion of the others. An approximate separation may help
nonetheless.
II.

DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTATION

Implementation of this discovery cost allocation proposal must overcome many difficulties. Workaday procedural rules often must forgo intellectually compelling models because the costs of administration overcome the theoretical advantages. The nature of the difficulties that will
be encountered by this theoretical model is illustrated by the following
partial list of questions.
How is a court to measure the total cost of complying with the discov-

ery reasonably needed by each side? If not by measuring anticipated
costs of response and anticipated benefits for this case, but by "average
values for similar cases in the past," categories of similarity must be
identified. But how is similarity to be identified? One dimension is need
for the information. Is this measured by the nature of the issues? By the
extent of information available to each party before discovery is undertaken? By the costs of acquiring information by other means? By the
stakes? By the probability of success-the anticipated value of information bearing on damages increases as the probability of liability increases?
It would be costly beyond any reasonable measure to assess need along
these and other dimensions on a case-by-case basis. The most that could
be done would be to adopt very crude measures of similarity that would
group quite unlike cases together because they involved some dimension
of similarity. One example might be actions claiming negligent infliction
of bodily injury by operating an automobile. The example might be refined by categories of injury, number and difficulty of the theories of
negligence, the presence of multiple parties or claims, and so on. However refined, the categories would cover cases that in fact had quite different reasonable needs for discovery.
The problem of categorization is the same as to compliance cost. That
will vary according to the amount of information already gathered,
whether for this litigation, other litigation, or nonlitigation purposes. It
also will vary according to the ways in which the information is organized; the organization may, fortuitously, make it easier or more difficult
to extract the relevant information. It also will vary with the efficiency
and imagination of the people who retrieve it and with the value of their
time. All else being equal, this would suggest that the total cost of reasonable discovery will depend on the identity of the litigants as well as the
nature of the case. Compare two drug manufacturers. One maintains
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complete and carefully indexed records concerning raw materials, manufacturing, inspection, and distribution that allow it to follow the complete
course of each production batch from beginning to the point of final sale.
The other, making the same product, has indifferent records scattered
among various plants and departments. The cost of complying with reasonable discovery demands in the first product liability action brought
against each will be dramatically different. Each, having been sued once,
may consider the possibility of being sued again. The first may maintain
in one place the fruits of discovery compliance, while the other returns
the discovered materials as nearly as may be to their original sources.
The cost of complying with reasonable discovery demands in the second
action brought against each also would be dramatically different.
Administration of a discovery cost categorization system also must
determine the time at which cases will be assigned to categories. Ongoing
discovery may reveal at first less valuable information and then, perhaps
because the earlier information has suggested other paths of inquiry and
perhaps because the parties have been driven to more inventive inquiry,
more valuable information. If the total cost of reasonable discovery and
the derived shifting point are set at the outset, the shifting point may be
reached before disclosure of the most important information.
The problem caused by setting the shifting point early in the litigation
can be aggravated by party behavior. Unless the demanding party proceeds by very carefully planned and discrete steps, and also is very lucky,
the responding party has an incentive to skew the progress of its responses. It should reveal the least useful information first, announce that
the shifting point has been reached, and declare that compliance costs
for all future responses must be carried by the demanding party.
The problem that the shifting point can be reached before the most
important discovery is accomplished could be addressed by fixing a shifting point at the outset but allowing amendment as greater familiarity with
the case supports more accurate determination. As discovery progresses,
it may readily appear that the reasonable total level of discovery is greater
than would have been predicted at the outset. The same result could be
reached by not setting the shifting point until discovery has been completed. Either response entails great difficulties. The method of setting a
shifting point at the outset, to be followed by adjustments, requires detailed judicial supervision. The burden of assessing the reasonable level
of discovery will be great. The method of setting the shifting point after
discovery has been completed would require as much judicial involvement and would invite decisions based on the actual fruits of discovery
rather than reasonable anticipation. Perhaps more important, ex post determination of the shifting point leaves the parties without any guidance
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while conducting discovery. Uncertainty as to the allocation could readily
destroy any leveling of the bargaining process that might result from the
attempt to achieve symmetrical discovery costs.
Another problem is that of translating specific relief into dollar terms.
For better or worse-for more or less guidance-it is commonly said
that specific relief often is justified precisely because money cannot measure an important value. How do we measure the cost of reasonable
discovery in a reapportionment action, a prison conditions case, or a suit
to abate atmospheric pollution? If we are going to exempt such cases,
one response will be to add claims for specific relief; perhaps that can be
controlled effectively.
Finally, it is suggested at one point that the discovery cost allocation
might be adjusted to reflect anticipated savings that result from avoiding
the need to uncover the same information at trial. If the allocation system
itself seems unworkable, this wrinkle is even more so.

III.

DIFFICULTIES OF ASSUMPTION

Beyond difficulties of implementation lie difficulties generated by the
assumptions chosen to build the cost allocation model. Before attempting
to move from model to implementation, it is necessary to ask whether
adjustments must be made to reflect differences between these assumptions and the circumstances that may prevail-occasionally or often-in
actual litigation.
The illustration is deliberately cast in terms of litigation in which the
only stakes are money. It seems likely that there is not much litigation
in which no party has any stake beyond the dollar level of the judgment.
Few defendants are onetime litigators and uninsured. The contingent-fee
system is held out as one way of financing litigation; it provides a repeat
player in the lawyer who has future stakes. Even some disputes between
uninsured onetime litigants are likely to have added stakes: to vindicate
self-esteem, protect a reputation, punish an offender, and so on. We
might respond by asserting that none of these interests should enter calculation of a reasonable level of discovery. A party who wants to pursue
such interests should bear the full cost of discovery that goes beyond
sharing the costs of reasonable discovery. This response may be persuasive in some settings, but it requires a value judgment that is not selfjustifying. At the least, it assumes that litigation is more concerned with
transferring money than with protecting other values. At the extreme, it
assumes that litigation is concerned only with transferring money in ways
that achieve monetarily efficient compliance with efficient legal rules.
The response is not persuasive if the legal system itself imposes future
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stakes. A sufficient illustration is provided by nonmutual preclusion. If a
party's defeat will preclude relitigation of common issues in reasonably
anticipated future litigation, that party must behave as if the stakes include the future litigation. At the very least, it is reasonable to engage
in more extensive preparation, including more extensive discovery. The
allocation of discovery costs between a party whose only stake is the
judgment in the present action and a party who perforce has higher stakes
requires independent justification. Perhaps the conclusion should be that
all incremental discovery costs of all parties should be imposed on the
party who fears future preclusion. The conclusion cannot be justified,
however, on any theory that this party is behaving in an unreasonable
fashion. The discovery costs can be entirely rational in relation to the
real stakes. The conclusion also must face another peril of nonmutual
preclusion. Having won the first action, the common party often cannot
be confident that defeat in a second action will not support nonmutual
preclusion in a third action; it may have to endure yet again the burden
of litigation involving future preclusion stakes.
Quite apart from the troubling questions about discovery that affects
future litigation, the fact remains that there is likely to be little litigation
in which all parties have only present stakes. This means that there will
be very little litigation that can provide models of money-stakes-only
reasonable discovery costs. At least as important, it will be virtually
impossible to identify which other actions satisfy this requirement. Experience cannot afford a reliable guide on the reasonable level of discovery
actually pursued by the parties in litigation with no future stakes.
Reliance on a money-stakes-only model may encounter another difficulty. It is assumed that there is no intrinsic value in achieving results
that come closer to the "right" decision. Spending $100 to achieve a $50
increase in accuracy is a waste. There is no need to argue the question
now; it is enough to observe that disagreement on this score would end
the discussion.
There also may be a puzzle in a different direction. The definition of
abuse assumes that it is unreasonable to ask for discovery when compliance costs exceed the expected value. The concept of value may be
complicated even in money-stakes-only litigation. A plaintiff may have a
great need to discover the facts supporting a possible defense-it costs
the defendant $100 to produce information that increases the plaintiff's
pessimism and reduces the expected value of the claim by $500 or, conceivably, to zero. The same is true of discovery that persuades the defendant that the claim is stronger than the defendant had believed. This
phenomenon can be accommodated in the "abuse" model by recognizing
that it is valuable to reduce uncertainty. Assigning a value, however,
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must be in some measure arbitrary. The phenomenon may be accommodated more easily in a cost-sharing model, so long as it is assumed that
the total cost of reasonable discovery has been set accurately.
Discovery reaches nonparties as well as parties. Concern with preserving symmetry of discovery costs between the parties would suggest that
they share equally the reasonable party costs of third-party discovery but
that the unconcerned third party bear all of its compliance costs. That
result would permit much discovery that produces benefits for all parties
well below nonparty compliance costs. In addition, exempting third-party
discovery from cost allocation rules would drive some discovery away
from more efficient party discovery and toward less efficient third-party
discovery. And in any event, it may seem bizarre to allow one party to
recover part-and beyond the shifting point all-of its compliance costs
but to deny any protection to nonparties.
An attempt to transfer nonparty compliance costs to the parties, so
that the parties do not exact compliance costs greater than the benefits
they realize, must find a theory of allocation. Equal allocation would
present severe difficulties, whether undertaken in an effort to preserve
cost symmetry or for some other reason. The information frequently is
more valuable to one party than another. It is tempting to treat third-party
discovery as the responsibility of the party who initiates the discovery.
This response is not convincing, however, since often both parties need
the information and each has access to the discovered information. No
one may be confident in predicting which party will gain more from the
information, and even confident predictions may go astray. Nonetheless,
there may be a temptation to impose the cost on the party that makes
the discovery request. Some practicing lawyers are reporting even now
that amended Civil Rule 45 is being used by nonparties to seek protection
against disclosing materials gathered in response to discovery subpoenas
until the demanding party has paid the compliance costs.
A deeper problem is that of trial preparation outside of discovery.
Before modem discovery methods were available, it was expected that
each party would bear its own costs of preparing for trial. Even now,
there is much preparation apart from discovery. The preparation involves
both seeking information from others and marshaling the information
within the litigants' own living and archival memories. The costs of discovery cannot be addressed apart from these costs. One reason is that
rules regarding discovery costs will affect the balance between discovery
and other modes of preparation. Another, and more important, reason is
that the value of discovery and the cost of compliance will depend on
the actual use and benefits of independent preparation. A party that has
prepared carefully on its own account may be able to respond to discov-
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ery rapidly and at low cost. The well-prepared party also is likely to
engage in less discovery and may benefit less from the information it
obtains. A party that has delayed preparation may find it expensive to
respond. The expense may not be a true measure of the cost of compliance, however, since the same expense might have been incurred at a
later time in preparation for a more nearly imminent trial. In the same
fashion, the dilatory party may benefit a great deal from discovering the
information garnered by its better-prepared adversary; such benefit
hardly seems occasion for raising the total level of reasonable discovery
and the shifting point.
Yet another problem is that of changing allocation of discovery compliance costs in the context of the adversary system that has developed
around the combination of modern discovery and other practices. The
proposal would change the present system to shift part of discovery costs
to the party whose reasonable needs for information entail greater compliance costs. In the illustration, and often in fact, that will be the plaintiff.
Why require payment of this cost-win or lose-when the plaintiff is not
obliged to pay many other defense costs?
Disclosure outside the demand-and-response mode of discovery raises
further questions. In part, the questions go to the effect of voluntary
disclosure. Information voluntarily disclosed may not have the same impact as information provided in response to discovery since there is no
orderly sanction process to enhance reliability. It can make sense to
use discovery to provide an official and at times binding confirmation of
information previously disclosed by voluntary means. Discovery in this
setting is in part informational and in part a means of tactical reassurance.
How do we measure these costs and benefits? Is it important that the
cost may depend on something as elusive as the degree of mutual trust
among counsel and the parties?
Despite the general proposition that a party has an incentive to disclose
information that would increase an adversary's pessimism, there also
are strong incentives not to disclose some such information, particularly
impeachment information that is more valuable if it appears as a surprise
at trial. The cost of complying with discovery demands for such material
may include the cost of protective discovery: before impeachment material is disclosed, the witness is deposed. Should compliance costs of this
sort be treated in the same way as other costs?
Other disclosure questions are raised by the new Rule 26(a)(1) that
requires voluntary disclosure as a prelude to discovery. Several districts
have implemented such disclosure requirements by local rule even now.
The duty to make disclosure is continuing. This changes the description
of part of the compliance costs from discovery to disclosure. The change
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of description does not involve any change of substance. If costs of discovery compliance are to be shared, the costs of disclosure should be
treated in the same way. The problem of separating preparation costs
from compliance costs, however, is exacerbated by disclosure. The costs
of disclosure must be incurred, moreover, unless the parties agree to
forgo disclosure. The actual effectiveness of disclosure in reducing discovery costs-its value-is likely to vary substantially from case to case.
Determining the reasonable level of discovery and its cost in relation to
the reasonable cost and actual benefit of disclosure is likely to be difficult
at the very best.
The purpose of allocating discovery costs so as to bring settlement
closer to the expected value of a complete-information judgment makes
one additional demand on the settlement process. The expected value of
the discovery cost award becomes an element of bargaining. The effect
is neutral only if all parties fulfill the conditions for efficient settlement
as to this added element. Unless the shifting point is set with great accuracy, this result seems unlikely. Instead, the real need of one party to
discover information after reaching the shifting point will defeat the attempt to attain symmetry of discovery costs.
An incidental question is raised by the assumption that an increase in
discovery costs usually causes a decline in trial costs. That may often
prove true, particularly when good litigators are at work. Discovery,
however, can produce vast amounts of information. There is a temptation
to use the information at trial. The same information often would not be
sought at trial for fear of its unknown dimensions and because exploring
the unknown is apt to take longer and prove more distracting. Judgments
about the allocation of discovery costs may remain the same whether
discovery reduces or increases trial costs, but the matter at least must
be resolved in its own terms.
IV.

BROADER THEORETICAL QUESTIONS

Inevitably, any proposal for allocating the costs of adversary discovery
focuses attention on the proper nature of the adversary system and the
role of the discovery system in it.
A.

Litigation Costs in General

We have a system that requires the parties to bear many of the costs
of litigation. Allocation of these costs between the parties seems haphazard: the victor is awarded some part of the costs to an extent that depends
on the nature of the litigation, while victor and vanquished each bear
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substantial portions of their own costs. At the same time, other costs are
treated as public. The question of discovery costs could be approached
most easily if we had an agreeable theory to distinguish private costs
from public costs and to allocate private costs. Why should lawyers not
be provided as a public service to any litigant who would rather trust a
public lawyer than pay a private lawyer? Why should other costs of
investigation and preparation not be paid according to the budget judgments of a public official? And so of discovery: Why should any part of
the cost be carried by the parties, much less nonparties? There is something crude and almost offensive about rationing access to public dispute
resolution by ability and willingness to pay, but we do it. If part of the
cost is to be allocated to the parties, why not require the loser to pay all
expenses of the victor? We have not even approached satisfactory answers to these questions. Any answer given to any part of the questions,
such as apportioning the costs of discovery compliance, must be unsatisfactory accordingly.
Reaction to this problem may depend in part on the type of litigation.
In typical personal injury tort litigation, we may well think that the costs
of discovery compliance should be borne as a cost of doing business or
a cost of liability insurance. Significant savings in transaction costs can
be made by forgoing allocation. We may have similar reactions to many
forms of civil rights litigation. Reactions are likely to be less uniform,
however, with respect to other forms of litigation. What does intuition
tell us about sharing or shifting the costs of discovery in business contract
litigation? Antitrust litigation with a private plaintiff?. Antitrust litigation
with a public plaintiff? Private treble damages claims under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?
B.

Purposes of Discovery

The model assumes that discovery is designed to uncover previously
unknown information. But it has a variety of purposes: one is to preserve
evidence that is known to all parties. The need for this form of discovery
may be difficult to compare across cases or even to predict in a particular
case. Another purpose is to determine whether there is reason to sue;
discovery for this purpose has a continuing legitimate role, as reflected
in the 1993 amendments of Civil Rule 11. Discovery for this purpose may
deserve different treatment. Discovery also may be designed to educate
an adversary in a variety of ways: a deposition may make it easier to
settle because it demonstrates that the adversary is unattractive as a
witness, not because any information is revealed; simply asking for infor-
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mation may educate an adversary about the importance of theories that
had been overlooked. It is not obvious that the cost of such discovery
should be allocated by the same principles as other forms of discovery.
C.

Party Administration

In many ways, the discovery process is designed to be implemented
by the parties without need for judicial interference. The emphasis on
forcing parties to work out discovery disputes for themselves is increasing. When party resolution fails and the district court must intervene,
very deliberate decisions have been made to restrict opportunities for
appellate review. Discovery is to be implemented by the parties first and
the district courts second. Efforts to add new rules for allocating discovery costs are likely to increase the level of judicial supervision. It seems
likely that detailed judicial supervision can be avoided, if at all, only by
procedures that coerce cost allocation by agreement of the parties, who
often do not have equal bargaining power, or that rely on quite general
and correspondingly crude estimates of reasonable levels of discovery
and reasonable costs of compliance.
D. Discovery as Justice

Disclosure of liability insurance coverage is required by Civil Rule
26(a)(1)(D). Despite the various purposes described in the Advisory Committee Note to former Rule 26(b)(2), the only plausible justification for
such discovery is to enhance the fairness of settlement and the rationality
of litigation. Insurance coverage often is the most important or even sole
asset available to satisfy a judgment. Knowledge of coverage can be
vitally important in determining the expected value of the judgment. It
has nothing to do with the merits of the dispute. This aspect of discovery
is not directly important to cost allocation proposals. The cost of disclosure ordinarily will be low. Discovery or disclosure of liability insurance
is important because it seeks fairness in bargaining and provides an opportunity to set realistic limits on the amount spent preparing for trial. If
discovery unabashedly pursues fairness in this dimension, perhaps there
are other dimensions in which it should pursue fairness rather than one
or another notions of efficiency.
E.

Work Product

Work-product doctrine sets limits on discovery that seek to reconcile
the cooperative character of discovery with the adversary character of
trial. We deliberately deny discovery of material that could improve pre-
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dictions of the probable outcome. In part, this doctrine may reflect an
effort to protect the "spontaneity of trial," in the belief that discovery
and deliberate preparation to meet work-product materials may distort
trial. In part, this doctrine reflects deeper concerns about the value of
preserving a traditional adversary system. Our system remains genuinely
adversary in much of the pretrial preparation process. It is overwhelmingly adversary in the trial process. Work-product doctrine responds to
the need to fit the cooperative dimensions of discovery into this adversary
framework. Discovery has not been pushed to the point of complete
cooperation, nor to the point closest to attainable efficiency. This result
suggests the continuing relevance of the most important questions regarding the role of discovery in an adversary system.
F.

Complete Sharing

On the face of things, discovery is a remarkably awkward means of
sharing information. It would be much easier and more efficient in some
ways to require every party to produce voluntarily all the information
available to it that may bear on the dispute. Why should we not require
complete sharing, so that no one need go through the wasteful ritual of
demand and response? And, with complete sharing, why should we not
leave the costs of producing information on the party who has the information to produce?
Practical responses of course abound. One is that one party may not
recognize the relevance of information useful to another. A second is
that we cannot trust each party to admit that it recognizes the relevance
of its information. An explicit demand can educate and can raise the
stakes of concealment. A third is that there may be much more relevant
information available to one party than any party needs or wants. Yet
others surely exist.
Beyond these practical reasons, however, lie much more confused traditions. Rule 26(a) disclosure is limited, and may be discarded by local
rule, court order, or agreement of the parties. We still do not require one
party to reveal many varieties of critically important information until it
is demanded. We impose an adversary burden of demanding it. If the
adversary is too inept to seek the information, it is proper to maintain
secrecy. A defendant who knows of three witnesses who will testify that
the defendant ran a red light can seek judgment as a matter of law because
the plaintiff has failed to follow through on any disclosure of their identities and has failed to produce any testimony that the light was red. Summary judgment can be sought on the ground that the plaintiff does not
have any evidence that the light was red.
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These rules tie directly to the rules allocating trial burdens of production. We assign the plaintiff the burden of adducing evidence that the
light was red. We do not require the defendant to help the plaintiff find
that evidence, except as disclosure, discovery, and trial subpoenas may
compel disclosure. And if the defendant does not have the information,
even in the sense in which information is known to any part of a defendant
organization, discovery cannot shift the burden of investigation to the
defendant. Often we do not ask whether the defendant can acquire the
information at lower cost-more efficiently-than the plaintiff. Relative
ease of access to evidence is only one factor considered in allocating
burdens, and even then it is considered only as a matter of general experience, not case-specific fact. Nor do we make a losing defendant pay
the full costs incurred by the plaintiff in acquiring the information by
investigation: even in the cases in which attorney fees are shifted, such
costs as the time devoted to the litigation by the party go uncompensated.
Many trial burdens continue to be controlled by rules developed long
before the emergence of modern discovery. Discovery has dramatically
reallocated the costs of preparing for trial. There is no coherent theory
to explain this effect of discovery. And there is no coherent theory that
can help us think about the ways in which we should reallocate the costs
of discovery. It has not been suggested that we should return closer to
prediscovery days by imposing on the party who would have the trial
burden of production on an issue the full costs of discovery compliance
on that issue. Such an allocation would be incredibly confused when
different parties have trial burdens on closely related issues: a sufficient
illustration is the common allocation to the plaintiff of the burden of
proving negligence and to the defendant of the burden of proving comparative negligence. More important, we may value discovery in part because it does shift part of the cost of preparation.
If trial burdens do not afford a comfortable guide to allocating the costs
of discovery, we must confront a system that provides no other obvious
guide. Equal sharing of the costs of reasonable discovery, imposing the
costs of additional discovery on the demanding party, must confront an
adversary system that makes no effort to allocate equally any of the other
costs of litigation. Equal distribution can occur only by accident, not by
the design of the system, and must be rare. There is no attempt to enforce
symmetry in other costs. An attempt to enforce symmetry in discovery
costs, even if it could be implemented, might improve matters if the
natural asymmetry of discovery costs aggravates other asymmetries.
There may be some intuitive ground for believing that parties who naturally bear a disproportionate share of discovery compliance costs also
naturally bear a disproportionate share of other costs. Even if there is
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frequent coincidence as a general matter, individual cases will often depart from the general experience. Yet there is no apparent suggestion
that we should attempt to tailor the allocation of discovery costs to reflect
other asymmetries-the assumption, indeed, is that there are none-nor
that we should attempt to allocate all other costs so as to achieve a
predictable symmetry of all foreseeable litigation costs at each moment
when settlement may be contemplated.
Perhaps it can be assumed that asymmetries of discovery costs generally aggravate other litigation cost asymmetries and that we can make
rules that rely on general experience rather than case-specific facts. Before adopting cost allocation rules, we still must confront the question
whether symmetry is the most important value. It may be better, as noted
above, to treat the typical asymmetries as desirable: although the plaintiff
must carry the burden of proving a product defective, the cost of gathering information about the product should be spread among all users as
one of the costs of production and sale. If the need to bear these costs
in discovery encourages the defendant to settle on terms that trade off
discovery costs for a recovery greater than the expected value of the
award at trial, the worst that can be said is that a litigating expense has
been converted into a windfall for the plaintiff that all parties prefer to
litigation. That is not a disastrous result. To the contrary, the result may
be desirable because it compensates for differences in the risk averseness
and bargaining power of the parties. To the extent that the expected
value of the trial award is reduced below full compensation because of
uncertainty as to the outcome, the settlement result may simply approach
closer to full compensation. Occasional spectacular awards apart, there
is little reason to believe that plaintiffs are systematically winning net
overcompensation through judgment or settlement.
It may be possible to frame the question in a simple way. Let it be
assumed that by allocating discovery compliance costs we could foster
settlements that more accurately mirror the amount that would be
awarded at trial. Although it is very easy to take trial judgment as the
measure of justice, there are good reasons to doubt that measure. The
amount that would be awarded at trial results from a system that does
not allocate all costs equally. Settlement often is valued not because of
efficiency but because it substitutes an "expected value" for the uncertain outcome of a real judgment. If all parties agree that there is a 0.50
probability of a $1,000,000 judgment, and all of the other conditions are
met, a $500,000 settlement is rational and efficient. It substitutes for a
judgment that might be zero, might be more than $1,000,000, and might
be somewhere in between. The chance that the judgment actually would
be $500,000 is vanishingly small. Yet many people regard the settlement
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as better justice because of doubts about the cogency of trial procedure
and uncertainty as to the wisdom of underlying substantive principles.
We do not expect that trials in fact always reach the results of "complete
information." We may be skeptical about the random and unforeseeable
character of errors. Even with complete information, moreover, trial of
civil cases theoretically resolves uncertainty by awarding the $1,000,000
if the tribunal is more than 0.50 certain that the plaintiff should prevail,
and $0 if the tribunal is no more than 0.50 certain. If the certainty levels
are set accurately, many of these judgments will be completely wrong.
Tribunals in fact often do not behave that way, preferring to resolve
uncertainty by compromising the award of damages. Settlements reflect
that behavior. Nonetheless, tribunals at times honor the all-or-nothing
rules. The compromise of settlement may seem more just as well as more
efficient. Tailoring discovery cost allocations to settlement must account
for the intrinsic virtues of the settlement process as well as the dubious
virtues of the trial process and trial-based judgments.
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